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Current discourse on the topic of language and mind is at about the in­
tellectual level of a chat show on the merits of democracy. Ideological 
nonsense, issued by famous scholars, fills the air, even the scientific jour­
nals. Serious scholars tend to leave well enough alone, since such ex­
changes reveal a banal underlying lack of analysis. It is as if the topic 
of “ Whorfianism” is a domain where anybody can let off steam, go on 
mental holiday, or pounce upon an ideological enemy. This is a pity, be­
cause the issues are deeply relevant to understanding our place in nature, 
and how we should understand our unique language capacity. Further, 
the issues are entirely open to careful analysis and empirical investiga­
tion, using the normal methods of the linguistic and psychological sciences.
In this chapter, I try to spell out in the simplest terms what the under­
lying issues are (but see Levinson 1996, 1997a, 2000, 2001, in press, for 
deeper discussion). We have to establish some kind of sensible mode of 
discourse before empirical results can be appreciated for what they are. 
As I outline at the end of the chapter, there is an accumulated body of 
such results, but first we had better try to establish the foundations for 
rational discourse.
2.2 The Doctrine of Simple Nativism and Its Coevolutionary Alternative
There is a widespread presumption in the cognitive sciences that lan­
guage is essentially innate. All the other species have innate communica­
tion systems, so why not humans too? Of course, languages don’t all
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sound alike, but that’s a matter of superficial clothing. Underneath, it’s 
the very same flesh and blood. There are two basic tenets to the doctrine. 
The first holds that the syntax of language is fundamentally universal 
and innate, a view of course associated with Chomsky. The second (of 
central interest to this chapter) holds that the semantics is given by an 
innate “ language of thought,” a view ably defended by Fodor (1975). 
Put them together and one has the widespread presumption, which I 
will dub Simple Nativism, which curiously enough is not generally asso­
ciated with any adaptational or evolutionary argument for language (see 
Levinson 2000). The central property of Simple Nativism is the claim 
that all the major properties of language, the object of study, are dictated 
by inbuilt mental apparatus. The observable variation is simply “ noise,” 
and nothing much can be learned from it. Protagonists of this view can 
be found across the cognitive sciences, including linguists like Jackendoff 
(see Landau and Jackendoff 1993), cognitive psychologists like Pinker 
(1994) or Gleitman (see, e.g., Li and Gleitman 2002), and the so-called 
evolutionary psychologists like Tooby and Cosmides (1992).
Despite its prominence, this doctrine is peculiar. First, it is impossible 
to reconcile with the facts of variation across languages. Second, it is a 
theory of innate (thus biological) endowment outside biology. There is 
no biological mechanism that could be responsible for providing us with 
all the meanings of all possible words in all possible languages— there 
are only 30,000 genes after all (about the number of the most basic 
words in just one language), and brain tissue is not functionally specific 
at remotely that kind of level. Third, it misses the most fundamental 
biological specialization of our species: the species has coevolved with 
culture—we cannot survive without it, but with it we have evolved a 
method of adapting to new ecological niches with much greater rapidity 
than our genome.
This last point is worth developing a little further. Human evolution 
has been shaped by the development of two distinct types of information 
transfer across generations, genetic and cultural, with systematic inter­
actions between them (Durham 1991). Just look at the evolution of 
our hands and the progression of the tools to be found in the archaeo­
logical record. Language is an obvious central part of this gene-culture 
coevolution—it is culture, responding to its particular ecological niche,
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that provides the bulk of the conceptual packages that are coded in 
any particular language. The contents of language, and much of its 
form, are thus largely the products of cultural tradition— but at the same 
time those cultural elements are constrained in many different ways by 
the biological nature of the organism, particularly its learning capacity. 
Rather precise information about this kind of interaction has now been 
provided by the study of infant speech perception. Infants are highly 
sensitive to the initial speech sounds around them, and they seem to have 
an innate fine-grained categorical system of perception shared with 
monkeys and other mammals. But by six months after birth infants have 
done something no monkey can do: they have warped this system of 
categories into line with the local language they are hearing around 
them. In that short time, they have acquired a cultural acoustic land­
scape. It is hard to escape the conclusion that human infants are “ built” 
to expect linguistic diversity and have special mechanisms for “ tuning 
in” to the local variety (Kuhl and Meltzoff 1996, 1997). We can expect 
to find exactly the same sort of interaction between prelinguistic percep­
tual distinctions and linguistically variable semantic distinctions. Thus, 
Choi et al. (2000; see also McDonough, Choi, and Mandler, in press; 
Bowerman and Choi, this volume) have shown that 9-month-old infants 
have equal facility to make, for example, English versus Korean spatial 
distinctions, while by 18 months they are tuned into the local language- 
specific distinctions. By the time we reach adulthood, just as we find alien 
language distinctions hard to hear, so English-speaking adults have lost 
the ability to make Korean distinctions even in nonlinguistic implicit 
categorization. Infants, unlike monkeys, are preadapted for cultural vari­
ation, for discovering the local system and specializing in it.
This alternative coevolutionary account, with psychology and cultural 
variation locked in mutual adaptation, is much better suited than Simple 
Nativism to understanding linguistic and cultural variation. It makes us 
think differently about what the biological endowment for language 
must be like. Instead of expecting that endowment to predict all the in­
teresting properties of observable languages, we need rather to think 
about it as a learning mechanism wonderfully adapted to discerning the 
variability of culturally distinctive systems— a mechanism that simul­
taneously puts limits on the variation that those systems can throw at
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it. On this account, the essential properties of language are divided be­
tween two inheritance systems, biological and cultural, and the long­
term interactions between them.
Simple Nativism has blocked sensible and informed discussion of the 
relation between language and thought for decades. Once the facts about 
linguistic diversity are properly appreciated, it will be clear that Simple 
Nativism ceases to be of any real interest.
2.3 Linguistic Variation
Simple Nativists hold that linguistic categories are a direct projection of 
universal concepts that are native to the species:
Knowing a language, then, is knowing how to translate mentalese into strings of 
words and vice versa. People without a language would still have mentalese, and 
babies and many nonhuman animals presumably have simpler dialects. (Pinker 
1994, 82)
Learning a language is on this view simply a matter of learning the local 
projection, that is, finding the local phonetic clothing for the preexisting 
concepts. Or as Li and Gleitman (2002, 266) put it:
Language has means for making reference to the objects, relations, properties, 
and events that populate our everyday world. It is possible to suppose that these 
linguistic categories and structures are more or less straightforward mappings 
from a preexisting conceptual space, programmed into our biological nature: 
Humans invent words that label their concepts.
Hence, they hold, “ the grammars and lexicons of all languages are 
broadly similar.”
The view just sketched is simply ill informed. There is no sense of 
“ broad” under which “ the grammars and lexicons of all languages are 
broadly similar.”  If there were, linguists could produce a huge range 
of absolute linguistic universals— but they cannot do so. As Greenberg 
(1986, 14) has put it, either language universals are trivial (“ All spoken 
languages have vowels” ), or they are conditional generalizations with 
statistical generality. It is fundamentally important to cognitive science 
that the true range of human language variation is not lost sight of.
It may be useful to review some of the fundamental parameters of 
variation. Natural languages may or may not be in the vocal-auditory
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channel—they can be shifted to the visual-manual one, as in sign lan­
guages. When they are broadcast in an acoustic medium, they may 
have as few as 11 or as many as 141 distinctive sounds or phonemes 
(Maddieson 1984). Languages may or may not have morphology, that 
is, inflection or derivation. Languages may or may not use constituent 
structure (as in the familiar tree-diagrams) to encode fundamental gram­
matical relations (Austin and Bresnan 1996; Levinson 1987). Thus, they 
may or may not have syntactic constraints on word or phrase order. 
Languages may or may not make use of such basic word class dis­
tinctions as adjective, adverb, or even, arguably, noun and verb (Mithun 
1999, 60-67). If they do, the kind of denotation assigned to each may be 
alien from an English point of view. Languages force quite different sets 
of conceptual distinctions in almost every sentence: some languages ex­
press aspect, others don’t; some have seven tenses, some have none; some 
force marking of visibility or honorific status of each noun phrase in a 
sentence, others don’t; and so on and so forth. Linguists talk so often 
about universals that nonlinguists may be forgiven for thinking that they 
have a huge list of absolute universals in the bag; but in fact they have 
hardly any that have even been tested against all of the 5% -10%  of 
languages for which we have good descriptions. Almost every new lan­
guage that is studied falsifies some existing generalization— the serious 
comparative study of languages, and especially their semantic structures, 
is unfortunately still in its infancy.
I emphasize the range of linguistic variation because that’s the funda­
mentally interesting thing about language from a comparative point of 
view. We are the only known species whose communication system is 
profoundly variable in both form and content (thus setting aside, e.g., 
minor dialects in bird song form; Hauser 1997, 275-276). So we can’t 
have the same kind of theory for human communication that we have 
for bee or even monkey communication; fixed innate schemas are not 
going to give us a full explanation of language. Of course, the human 
innate system must be superbly equipped to expect and deal with the 
variation— and so it is. This is what Kuhl (1991) has so nicely shown in 
the realm of speech sounds, as noted above: infants, unlike monkeys, are 
built to specialize early in the local sound-system.
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Let us now pursue the subject of special interest to this chapter: 
semantic variation across languages. Take the spatial domain. On first 
principles, this is a conceptual domain where we would least expect 
major semantic variation; after all, every higher animal has to be able to 
find its way home, and mammals share a great many specialized ana­
tomical and neurophysiological systems dedicated to telling them where 
they are and where things are with respect to them. So if the Fodor, 
Pinker, or Gleitman story is correct anywhere, it should be so here: spa­
tial categories in language should be direct projections of shared innate 
conceptual categories. But it turns out that there is not the slightest bit of 
evidence for this.
We may take a few simple examples of spatial concepts where univer­
sal agreement on spatial categories has been expected. Let us start with 
deixis, often presumed universal in all essentials. It has been supposed 
that all languages have demonstratives that make at least a contrast be­
tween ‘this’ and ‘that’, but even spoken German seems to falsify that 
(some German dialects arguably have no demonstratives at all, but only 
articles). And for languages that do have two demonstratives, it turns out 
that there are at least four semantic types; more generally, research 
shows almost as many semantic distinctions in demonstratives as lan­
guages investigated (Meira and Dunn, in preparation). Likewise, it has 
been supposed that all languages make a basic distinction between 
‘come’ and ‘go’ verbs. But in fact not all languages handle this distinction 
in lexical verbs (instead, e.g., using ‘hither’, ‘thither’ particles), and, when 
they do, there is tremendous variation in exactly what is coded. Typi­
cally, but not always, ‘go’ has no deictic coding, merely pragmatically 
contrasting with ‘come’, and the ‘come’ verb may or may not entail 
arrival at the deictic center, and may or may not allow motion continued 
beyond this center (Wilkins and Hill 1995).
Next, let us turn to the subdomain of so-called topological spatial 
relations. These are relations of contact or propinquity (like English on, 
at, in, near), which, following Piaget and Inhelder (1956), have been 
taken to be the simplest kind of spatial relation. Landau and Jackendoff 
(1993) have suggested that closed-class spatial expressions in languages 
are highly restricted in conceptual type, referring only to “ the very gross 
geometry of the coarsest level of representation of an object—whether
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it is a container or a surface” (p. 227). On the basis of English preposi­
tions, they confidently make universal claims of the following sort: no 
language will have spatial relators expressing specific volumetric shapes 
of ground objects— for example, there will be no preposition or closed- 
class spatial relator sprougb meaning ‘through a cigar-shaped object’ 
(p. 226). But the Californian language Karuk has precisely such a spatial 
prefix, -vara ‘in through a tubular space’ (Mithun 1999, 142)! The whole 
set of claims is based on woeful ignorance of the crosslinguistic facts.
Still, however rich the rest of the semantic distinctions, it could be that 
every language encodes a notion precisely like English on and in. Not so: 
many languages fractionate these notions and indeed have much more 
specific notions, like ‘in a hemispherical container’ versus ‘in a cylindrical 
container’. Tzeltal makes many such distinctions in spatial predicates 
(Brown 1994). But perhaps we simply need to qualify the claim: if a 
language encodes spatial relations in prepositions (or postpositions), then 
every such language encodes a notion precisely like English on or in. This 
is not remotely true either. In current work, Sergio Meira and I have 
mapped the adpositions (prepositions or postpositions) of a dozen lan­
guages of different stocks onto exactly the same set of 70 spatial scenes, 
each scene depicting a subtype of a topological relation.1 What emerges 
quite clearly is that there is no basic agreement on what constitutes an 
‘in’ scene, a spatial relation of containment, or any other basic topologi­
cal relation. It is simply an empirical matter that spatial categories are 
almost never the same across languages, even when they are as closely 
related as English and Dutch.
Finally, we have also surveyed a wide sample of languages for the 
kinds of coordinate systems or frames of reference they use for describ­
ing the location of objects widely separated from a reference object 
(Levinson, in press). In these situations, some kind of angular specifica­
tion on the horizontal plane is called for— as in ‘The ball is behind the 
tree’. It turns out that although languages vary greatly in the detailed 
geometry employed, there are three main families of solutions: an ego­
centric (or more accurately viewpoint-dependent) relative system (as 
in the ‘The ball is left of the tree’), a geocentric absolute system (as in 
‘The ball is north of the tree’), and an object-centered intrinsic system 
(as in ‘The ball is at the front of the truck’). These three are all polar
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coordinate systems and constitute the best claim for universals in the 
spatial domain. But there are some important caveats. First, not all lan­
guages use all three systems. Rather, they form an inventory from which 
languages must choose at least one— all combinations are possible, ex­
cept that a relative system entails an intrinsic system. That means there 
are languages without words for ‘left’ or ‘right’ directions, but where all 
spatial directions must be specified in terms of cardinal directions like 
‘east’ (so one has to say things like ‘Pass the northern cup’, ‘There’s a fly 
on your northern leg’, etc.). Second, as mentioned, the local instantia­
tion of any one system may be of a unique kind. Consider for example 
relative systems, which if fully developed involve a ‘left’, ‘right’, ‘front’, 
‘back’ set of distinctions. Now, these distinctions are very variously 
mapped. They involve a projection of viewer-centered coordinates onto a 
landmark object, so that, for example, the ball can be said to be behind 
the tree. In English, this projection involves a reflection of the viewer’s 
own left-right-front-back coordinates onto (in this case) the tree, so the 
tree’s front is the side facing us, and its back is the side away from us, 
but its left and right are on the same side as the viewer’s. In Hausa and 
many other languages, this projection involves translation, so ‘left’ and 
‘right’ remain as in English, but ‘front’ and ‘back’ are reversed (‘The ball 
is behind the tree’ means it is between the viewer and the tree). In some 
dialects of Tamil, the projection involves rotation, so ‘front’ and ‘back’ 
are like in English, but ‘left’ and ‘right’ are reversed. And so on and so 
forth— there is plenty of semantic variation. Although the choices be­
tween different frames of reference are limited, they are quite sufficient to 
induce the very strongest “Whorfian” effects, as described below (and see 
Levinson 1996; Pederson et al. 1998).
To sum up: the Simple Nativist idea (as voiced by Pinker and Gleit­
man) that universal concepts are directly mapped onto natural language 
words and morphemes, so that all a child-learner has to do is find the 
local name as it were, is simply false. There are vanishingly few universal 
notions, if any, that every language denotes with a simple expression. 
Even the renowned case of the color words only substantiates this fact: 
languages vary substantially in the number of color words they have, 
and what they actually denote (Kay and McDaniel 1978; Kay, Berlin, 
and Merrifield 1991). A term glossed as ‘red’ may— according to the
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standard theory—actually include brown, yellow, and related hues, and 
‘black’ may include blue and green. But some languages have at best only 
incipient color words (Levinson 2000), and this has required substantial 
weakening of the standard theory (Kay and MafE 1999). There is really 
no excuse for continued existence of the myth of a rich set of lexically 
packaged semantic universals. Removing that myth opens the way for 
entertaining seriously a heretical idea.
2.4 The Very Thought: Could the Language We Speak Influence the 
Way We Think?
There is an ideological overtone to Simple Nativism: the independence of 
thought from language opens up to us the freedom of will and action 
(“ [Slince mental life goes on independently of particular languages, con­
cepts of freedom and equality will be thinkable even if they are name­
less” Pinker 1994, 82). So Whorfianism and linguistic determinism have 
to be impossible! This moral imperative is beside the point, not only be­
cause we are not in the preaching business, but also because, despite 
some incautious language, no one, not even Whorf, ever held that our 
thought was in the infernal grip of our language. Whorf’s own idea was 
that certain grammatical patterns, through making obligatory semantic 
distinctions, might induce corresponding categories in habitual or non- 
reflective thought in just the relevant domains (see Lucy 1992b for care­
ful exposition). Now that idea, generalized also to lexical patterns, seems 
neither anti-American nor necessarily false. More generally still, it seems 
fairly self-evident that the language one happens to speak affords, or 
conversely makes less accessible, certain complex concepts. There are 
languages with no or very few number words, and without a generative 
system of numerals— it seems unlikely that the speakers of such a lan­
guage would ever entertain the notion ‘seventy-three’, let alone that of a 
logarithm, and certainly their fellows would never know if they did. As 
mentioned, there are languages that only use cardinal direction terms for 
spatial directions, where one must constantly be able to unerringly locate 
the center of a quadrant at, say, 15 degrees east of north— speakers of 
such languages can be shown to have a developed sense of direction of a 
different order of magnitude from speakers of languages that lack such
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constant reference to geocentric coordinates (Levinson, in press). If they 
didn’t have such competence, they couldn’t communicate; the language 
affords, even requires, certain underlying computations (see section 2.5). 
In this sort of way, languages can differentially impede, facilitate, or re­
quire underlying mental operations.
In this section, I want to show that the web of theoretical commit­
ments we already have in the linguistic and psychological sciences seem 
to converge on the presumption that speaking specific languages does 
indeed have cognitive consequences for the speakers of those languages.
First, take the simple question “ Do we think the same way that we 
speak?” Making various classical assumptions (e.g., accepting the notion 
of a representation), this question can reasonably be rendered as the 
more specific “ Are the representations we use in serious nonlinguistic 
thinking and reasoning the very same representations that underlie lin­
guistic meanings?” The answer, I have shown (Levinson 1997a), has to 
be no. The reasons are various, but conclusive: semantic representations 
have to be decoupled from conceptual representations to allow for vari­
ous properties of linguistic meaning like deixis, anaphora, very limited 
lexica, linearization, and so on, which are clearly not properties of con­
ceptual representations. Besides, there are many different kinds of con­
ceptual representation, from the imagistic to the propositional. But there 
are also quite persuasive arguments to the effect that though linguistic 
and nonlinguistic representations are distinct, there must be at least one 
level of conceptual representation that is closely aligned to a semantic 
level; otherwise, we couldn’t transform the one into the other with the 
facility we have, as shown by the speed of language encoding and com­
prehension. Further, any semantic distinctions must be supported by the 
underlying conceptual distinctions and processes that are necessary to 
compute them (if you have a lexical concept ‘seven’— and not all lan­
guages do—you had better be able to count to 7 if you are going to use it 
correctly). So, overall, that level of conceptual representation is close to, 
but not identical to, a level of semantic representation.
Our next simple question is, “ Do all humans think alike?” Given that 
there are multiple representation systems (for vision, touch, smell, etc.), 
many of them specialized to the sensory modalities, and given that many 
human sensory experiences are basically similar (given the world we all
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inhabit), there is no doubt that there is a broad base of “ psychic unity” 
in the species. But we are interested in the more abstract representations 
in which we think and reason, which are closest to language. We can 
transform the basic question then into the more specific “ Is the concep­
tual representation system closest to semantic representation universal 
in character?” The answer to that question is—perhaps surprisingly— 
almost certainly no. The answer can be derived from both first princi­
ples and empirical investigation. Here I concentrate on the reasoning 
from first principles, postponing the empirical arguments to the follow­
ing section.
Why must the conceptual representations closest to semantic repre­
sentations be nonuniversal? Because languages vary in their semantic 
structure, as we saw in section 2.3. Simply put, the fact is that there are 
few if any lexical concepts that universally occur in all the languages of 
the world; not all languages have a word (or other expression) for ‘red’ 
or ‘father’ or ‘in’ or ‘come’ or even ‘if’ . Now the consequences of that 
basic fact are easily enough appreciated. Let us pursue a reductio. We 
have established that semantic representations map fairly directly, but 
not exactly, onto the closest level of conceptual representation (CR). 
Assume now that CR is universal. Then, allowing for some slippage, 
semantic representations (SR) must be roughly universal too. But they are 
not. Therefore, we must abandon the assumption that CR is universal.
Approaching the problem from the other direction, we know that 
languages code different concepts at the lexical level. Now assume— as 
Fodor and many psychologists do— that corresponding to a lexical item 
is a single holistic concept (Fodor, Fodor, and Garrett 1975). Further 
assume, as they do, that SR and CR are coextensive. Then, since we 
think in CR, users of different languages think differently. So, it follows 
that “ nondecompositionalists” (i.e., those who do not think that lexical 
concepts decompose into subconcepts) are implicit Whorfians— a fact 
that they do not seem to have appreciated.2
Linguists tend to be decompositionalists—they tend to think that 
lexical concepts are complex, composed out of atomic concepts. Nat­
urally, they are not always so naive about semantic variation as the 
psychologists. But they think they can escape the immediate Whorfian 
consequence: languages encode different concepts at the lexical level, but
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they “ compose” those semantical concepts from a universal inventory of 
atomic concepts. Even assuming that SR and CR are closely related, as 
seems to be the case, it no longer seems to follow that different languages 
require different conceptual relations, or that speaking a language would 
induce different ways of thinking: both SR and CR could be universal at 
the level of conceptual primes or primitives. So we can cook our varied 
semantic cakes out of the same old universal flour and sugar.
Though I am sympathetic with the decompositional move, it is hardly 
the intellectual triumph that it may seem. Suppose I hypothesize a uni­
versal inventory of 20 or 100 primes, and now I come across a language 
that has words that won’t decompose into those primes. What will I  do? 
Add to the universal inventory the features we need for that language, of 
course. So what makes them universal? At least one language uses them! 
How would you falsify such a theory? There isn’t any way to falsify a 
theory of universals that consists in an augmentable list of features that 
any one language may freely select from. It’s the weakest possible kind of 
theory— it would need to be supplemented with a theory that tells us 
why just those features and no others are in the inventory, and we are in 
no position to do that because we have as yet no idea of the real extent 
of semantic variation.
But there’s another problem with decomposition. Psycholinguistic evi­
dence shows that when words are activated, the concept as a whole is 
activated, not little bits of it. And the psychologists have compelling evi­
dence that we don’t think at that atomic level—we think at the macro­
level of conceptual wholes, the level reflected in lexical concepts. The 
reasons for this lie partly in properties of short-term memory, the major 
bottleneck in our computing system. For short-term memory is limited 
to, say, five chunks at a time, while not caring a jot about how com­
plex the underlying chunks are— or, put another way, what they can be 
decomposed into (Miller 1956; Cowan 2001). We don’t have to think 
about a hundred as ‘ten tens’ when doing mental arithmetic, or aunt as 
‘mother’s sister, or father’s sister, or father’s brother’s wife, or mother’s 
brother’s wife’ when greeting Aunt Mathilda. Composing complex con­
cepts gives enormous power to our mental computations, and most of 
those complex concepts are inherited from the language we happen to 
speak. So the linguists are wrong to think that lexical decomposition
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will let them off the Whorfian hook. Sure, it allows them to hold a 
remoter level of universal concepts, and it might help to explain how we 
can learn complex cultural concepts, but the conceptual level closest to 
the semantic representations, and the level in which we compute, seems 
likely to be heavily culture specific.
So, given the facts of semantic variation, and what we know about 
mental computation, it is hard to escape the conclusion that, yes, the 
ways we speak—the kinds of concepts lexically or grammatically en­
coded in a specific language— are bound to have an effect on the ways 
we think. And this conclusion is going to be general over all the different 
kinds of theory scholars are likely to espouse: noncompositional or 
compositional representational theories, and equally of course connec- 
tionist theories, where activation patterns are a direct reflection of input 
patterns.
2.5 The Issues in the Light of Empirical Evidence
So now at last we might be prepared to accept the idea that it is worth 
empirically investigating the kinds of influence a specific language might 
have on our mental coding of scenes and events, our nonlinguistic mem­
ory and inference. In fact, there is already a quite impressive body of 
evidence that demonstrates significant effects here. I will review a few 
examples, concentrating on our own work.
Curiously enough, the color work in the tradition of Berlin and Kay 
(1969), which has been taken to indicate simple universals of lexical 
coding, has also yielded evidence for the impact of linguistic categories 
on memory and perceptual discriminations. As noted above, the lexical 
universals are of a conditional sort; for example, if a language has just 
three color words, one will cover the “ cool” range (black, green, blue), 
another the “ warm” range (red, yellow, orange), and another the “ bright” 
range (white, pink, pale blue, etc.) (see Kay and McDaniel 1978). So it is 
easy to find languages that differ in their color coding. Lenneberg and 
Roberts (1956) had earlier shown that having specific terms for, say, 
‘yellow’ versus ‘orange’, helped English speakers memorize colors, com­
pared to Zuni speakers who have no such lexical discrimination. Lucy 
(1981) showed similar effects for Yucatec versus Spanish versus English
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speakers, and Davidoff, Davies, and Roberson (1999) did the same for 
English versus Berinmo. Kay and Kempton (1984) explored the effects of 
linguistic coding on perceptual discriminability and found that if a lan­
guage like English discriminates ‘blue’ and ‘green’, while another like 
Tarahumara does not, English speakers but not Tarahumara speakers 
will exaggerate the perceptual differences on the boundary. This suggests 
that our visual perception may be biased by linguistic categorization just 
as our auditory perception clearly is by the specific phonemes in a lan­
guage (which is why of course late second language learners have diffi­
culty perceiving and producing the alien speech sounds).
Turning to our own work, in a large-scale long-term collaborative 
enterprise involving two score researchers, we have researched linguistic 
differences in the spatial domain. Our goals have been first, to under­
stand the linguistic differences here, and second, to then explore the 
relation of those linguistic differences to nonlinguistic cognition. I have 
already outlined above some of the quite surprising linguistic differences 
to be found across languages; in general, it is hard to find any pair of 
spatial descriptors with the same denotation across languages (see, e.g., 
Levinson and Wilkins, in press). In the subdomain of frames of reference, 
we have pursued the nonlinguistic correlates in detail. The following is 
a synopsis of much detailed work (see Levinson 1996, 1997b, in press; 
Pederson et al. 1998; and references therein).
As mentioned above, languages make different use of the three basic 
frames of reference. Some languages, like English or other European 
languages, employ the relative frame of reference (involving left/right/ 
front/back terms projected from a viewpoint) along with the intrinsic 
(involving properties of the landmark or reference object, e.g., its intrin­
sic top, back, sides, etc.). Other languages, like Tzeltal or Arrernte, use 
no relative frame of reference, but instead supplement an intrinsic system 
with an absolute one— that is, a cardinal-direction type system. In lan­
guages like these, speakers can’t say ‘Pass me the cup to your left’, or 
‘Take the first right’, or ‘He’s hiding behind the tree’—the relevant spa­
tial expressions simply don’t exist. Instead, they have to say ‘Pass me the 
cup to the west’, or ‘Take the first turn to the south’, or ‘He’s hiding east 
of the tree’, as appropriate. Such cardinal-direction systems are actually 
quite diverse (e.g., they may have arbitrary directions unrelated to the
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earth’s poles) and are always different from the English speaker’s use 
of map coordinates (e.g., in the English system there is no linguistic 
convention about how many degrees on either side of grid-north still 
constitutes ‘north’, and English speakers only use this system on a geo­
graphic scale).
We made the following predictions. First, speakers of languages with 
absolute coordinates should have a better sense of direction than speakers 
of relative languages: they not only have to know where, say, ‘south’ is 
at any one moment (otherwise they couldn’t speak the language), but 
they also need to know, for example, that place B is south of A, because 
they may have a verb ‘go-south’ properly used for any motion from A 
to B. We transported people from three absolute communities to novel 
locations and got them to point to a range of other locations at varying 
distances. They can do this with remarkable accuracy, but speakers of 
relative languages cannot (Levinson, in press). We have also examined 
unreflective gesture while speaking: for absolute speakers, gestures to 
places are geographically accurate; for relative speakers, are not. Second, 
we supposed that speakers of absolute languages would have to main­
tain internal representations of space in terms of fixed bearings, rather 
than egocentric coordinates. That is because if memories were coded in 
egocentric coordinates, there would be no way to describe them in the 
relevant language: there is no translation algorithm from egocentric 
coordinates to geocentric ones, or vice versa (you can’t get from the de­
scription ‘The knife was north of the fork’ to the description ‘The knife 
was left of the fork’, or vice versa). Since one might want to talk about 
any observed situation, it had better be memorized in coordinates ap­
propriate to the language. To test this, we invented a rotation paradigm, 
with which it is possible to distinguish nonlinguistic mental coding in any 
of the frames of reference. For example, subjects see an arrow on a table 
pointing to their left, or south. They are now rotated 180 degrees and are 
asked to place the arrow on another table so it is just as before. If they 
point it to their left, they thought about it in terms of egocentric coor­
dinates; if to their right (i.e., south), in geocentric coordinates. This par­
adigm allows examination of different psychological capacities, and we 
designed a battery of tests exploring recognition memory, recall, and in­
ference of different kinds, all conducted under rotation. The tasks were
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carried out in four relative and six absolute language communities. The 
results are quite startling: overwhelmingly, subjects follow the coding 
pattern in their language when performing these entirely nonlinguistic 
tasks (Levinson 1996, in press).
We find these results to be convincing evidence that linguistic coding 
is both a facilitator of a specific cognitive style and a bottleneck, con­
straining mental representations in line with the output modality. It 
seems that preferred frames of reference in language deeply affect our 
mental life. They affect the kind of mental coding of spatial relations in 
memory, and the way in which we reason about space, since the different 
frames of reference have different logical properties (see Levinson 1996). 
They affect the kinds of mental maps we maintain (as shown by the 
navigation experiments mentioned above), even the kind of mental im­
agery we use when we gesture. These are anything but superficial corre­
lates of a mode of linguistic coding.
In a recent paper, Li and Gleitman (2002) try to resist these con­
clusions and reassert a Simple Nativist perspective. They carried out one 
simplified version of one of our tasks with an American student popula­
tion and claimed that they could induce absolute or relative coding by 
manipulating the conditions of the task. First, the task yielded a relative 
result indoors, but a mixed relative/absolute result outdoors. Second, by 
placing salient landmarks or spatial cues at alternate ends of the stimulus 
and response tables, subjects could be made to construct the response in 
line with the landmark cue. Li and Gleitman conclude that we all think 
equally in relative or absolute frames of reference; it just depends on 
the conditions under which one coding system or another becomes more 
appropriate. Unfortunately, their results are either not replicable (the 
outdoors condition) or betray a misunderstanding of the nature of the 
three frames of reference (the landmark cues condition). When they used 
salient spatial cues on the stimulus and response tables, what they were 
actually doing was invoking a response in the intrinsic frame of refer­
ence, not the absolute one. We showed this by reproducing their experi­
ment and introducing a new condition: subjects were now rotated 90 
degrees instead of 180 degrees (Levinson et al. 2002). If you see a row of 
animals headed leftward, or south, on table 1 toward a jug, and are then 
rotated to face table 2 at 90 degrees, and are asked to place the animals 
just as they were (with an emphasis on remembering which animals were
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in which order), a response that preserves them heading left or heading 
south or heading toward the jug can easily be distinguished. English- or 
Dutch-speaking subjects will place the animals so they are heading either 
left (relative) or toward the jug (intrinsic), not south (absolute). That’s 
because English and Dutch offer both the relative and intrinsic frames 
of reference— although the relative is dominant, as can be shown by 
increasing the memory load (e.g., by adding to the number of animals), 
whereupon the relative is selected over the intrinsic. In short, pace Li and 
Gleitman, the evidence remains that the frames of reference used in peo­
ple’s language match those used in their nonlinguistic cognition.
There are many other results that support the idea that linguistic 
coding has an effect on nonlinguistic cognition. Special mention should 
be made of the work of John Lucy (1992a; see also Lucy and Gaskins, 
this volume), which demonstrates that the original ideas of Whorf can be 
verified— namely, the idea that grammatical patterning with semantic 
correlates may have an especially powerful effect on implicit catego­
rization. English has obligatory number marking (singular vs. plural) on 
countable nominals, while Yucatec has only optional number marking, 
mostly only on animates. Following the hypothesis that this insistent 
number marking in English might have nonlinguistic effects, Lucy 
showed that English speakers are better at remembering number in 
nonlinguistic stimuli. In work with Suzanne Gaskins, he has gone on to 
show that this lack of number marking in Yucatec is associated with 
nominals whose semantics are unspecified for quantificational unit (Lucy 
and Gaskins 2001). They tend to denote not bounded units, but essence 
or “ stuff” ; thus, the term used for ‘banana’ actually denotes any entity 
made of banana-essence (e.g., the tree or the leaf or the fruit). On sorting 
tasks, Yucatec speakers behave differently than English speakers: English 
speakers tend to sort by shape or function, Yucatec speakers by the 
material out of which things are made. The suggestion is that the pat­
tern in the grammar has far-reaching correlations with implicit mental 
categories.
2.6 Conclusion
Where are we? I have tried to establish that (1) languages vary in their 
semantics just as they do in their form, (2) semantic differences are
42 Levinson
bound to engender cognitive differences, (3) these cognitive correlates of 
semantic differences can be empirically found on a widespread basis. 
As a consequence, the semantic version of Simple Nativism ought to be 
as dead as a dodo. But it isn’t.
Why not? One reason is that its proponents think they have an argu­
ment that it just has to be right, so no negative evidence will be seriously 
entertained! The argument of course is a learnability argument. Consider 
what the poor child has to do: find the meaning corresponding to some 
acoustic signal—the child must segment the signal, find the word forms, 
and then hypothesize the meanings. Suppose, as Fodor, Pinker, and Gleit- 
man hold, that the child is already provided with the relevant conceptual 
bundles; then all she has to do is map strings of phonemes to ready-made 
conceptual bundles. This is already difficult, since there are lots of those 
bundles. Now, suppose the picture was radically different, and the child 
had to construct the bundles— not a chance! Even worse, suppose that 
the child has not only to construct the possible meanings for words, but 
even to figure out how the adults think, since they think differently in 
different cultures. Now the child first has to learn the local cognitive 
style, and then construct the relevant meanings in line with the cognitive 
style, before finally being in a position to map the acoustics onto the 
meanings. The picture is hopeless— Simple Nativism just has to be right!
We can disarm this argument (but see Levinson 2001 for the full 
counterargument). First, the Fodorean picture doesn’t really help. If lan­
guages only label antecedently existing concepts, the set of those con­
cepts must include every possible concept lexicalizable in every possible 
language— a billion or more to be sure. So how will knowing that the 
needle is already in the haystack help the child find the one correct con­
cept to match to a particular acoustic wave? Second, the picture of the 
child thumbing through her innate lexicon to find the right antecedently 
existing concept is surely absurd in the first place; once the lexicon gets 
to any size at all, it will be much easier to construct the concept than 
to find it. What the child is going to do is try and figure out what those 
peculiar adults or elder siblings are really preoccupied with. She will use 
every clue provided to her, and there are plenty. And some of the most 
valuable clues will be provided in many different ways by the fact that 
the adults think in a way tightly consistent with the semantics of the
rlanguage they speak. For example, suppose the adults speak a language 
where the relative frame of reference predominates. Every aspect of 
the environment will reflect that fact—the way doors or books open, the 
arrangement of things (knife always to the right of the fork, socks in 
the left drawer), the nature of gesture (pointing to the side the referent 
was on when they were looking at it, not where it actually is from here 
now), the preferred side of the sidewalk they choose to walk on. In con­
trast, suppose the adults speak a language where the absolute frame of 
reference predominates. Now they won’t care about preserving ego­
centric constancies; they will only care that one sleeps with one’s head 
always to the north, builds windbreaks to the east, and, when pointing, 
points in the veridical direction. A thousand little details of the built 
environment and, more importantly, the conduct of interaction (see 
Tomasello, this volume) will inform the discerning toddler again and 
again till she gets the message. It is just because we think in line with 
how we speak, that the clues are not all in the language but are dis­
tributed throughout the context of language learning. This new picture 
doesn’t banish the puzzles of how children perform the incredible feat of 
learning a language, but one thing is certain: it doesn’t make it any more 
of an impossible feat than it was on the old picture given to us by the 
Simple Nativists.
So the overall message is that Simple Nativism has outlived its utility; 
it blocks a proper understanding of the biological roots of language, 
it introduces incoherence into our theory, it blinds us to the reality of 
linguistic variation and discourages interesting research on the language- 
cognition interface. As far as its semantic tenets go, it is simply false— 
semantic variation across languages is rich in every detail. We don’t map 
words onto antecedently existing concepts, we build them according to 
need. That’s why cognitive development in children exists, and why 
the history of science shows progress. The reason we have a developed 
vocabulary (instead of the limited repertoire of other animals) is that we 
have found it helps us to think. How it does that is explained by that 
foundational cornerstone of cognitive psychology, Miller’s (1956) theory 
of recoding as a method of increasing computational power by getting 
around the bottleneck of short-term memory (see Cowan 2001 for an 
update). Linguistically motivated concepts are food for thought.
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Notes
1. The scenes were devised by Melissa Bowerman, with additions by Eric Peder­
son, and are available as the stimulus set Topological Relations Picture Series of 
the Max Planck Institute for Psycholinguistics, Nijmegen. For a preliminary re­
port, see the Annual Report 2001, Max Planck Institute for Psycholinguistics 
« http://www.mpi.nl)).
2. Fodor himself adopts the only way out of this dilemma, which is to say that 
every lexical concept in every language that ever has been and ever will be is 
already sitting there in our heads. So Cro-Magnon man already had the notions 
‘neutrino’ and ‘piano’, but probably hadn’t gotten around to giving them pho­
netic form!
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3
The Key Is Social Cognition
Michael Tomasello
3.1 Introduction
Surveying human evolution and history, it is difficult to find a good anal­
ogy to language. But the closest might be money. Economic activities— 
in the broad sense of people exchanging goods and services with one 
another— antedate the invention of money by many millennia, and eco­
nomic activities do not absolutely require money. But the invention of 
money as a symbol for exchanges, and its historical development into 
more complex forms such as paper and electronic money, is clearly re­
sponsible for some new forms of economic activity. Certainly, modern 
economies could not exist as they do without something resembling the 
monetary symbol systems currently in use.
Let’s try another, more cognitive analogy. Basic quantitative skills 
are possessed by all mammals and even some bird species, and so they 
assuredly do not rely on written symbols and notations. But when hu­
man beings invented written symbols and notations to help them count 
and calculate, all of a sudden they began to count and calculate in some 
new and more complex ways. And it is well known that some notation 
systems enable certain kinds of calculations that others do not. For ex­
ample, it is basically impossible to imagine doing algebra or calculus (not 
to mention long division) with Roman numerals; something like Arabic 
numerals, based on the place value system (and with a zero), is required 
for modern mathematics.
The way human beings behave and think thus changes when symbols, 
including linguistic symbols, become involved. Money and mathema­
tics are two good examples, but the analogy to language is not perfect.
